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COMPETITION POLICY AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR BIG DATA:  
PROPOSITIONS TO HARNESS THE POWER OF BIG DATA 
 WHILE CURBING PLATFORMS’ ABUSE OF DOMINANCE  
 
 - Note by Annabelle Gawer
*
 -  
1. Introduction 
1.1 Digital Era: What is new and different?  
1. Over the past 20 years, the global economy has been reshaped by digital technologies. All over 
the world, individuals and organizations have adopted and increasingly rely upon digitally-enabled devices 
and technologies to help them conduct essential daily tasks.  
2. We are connected via the Internet and telecommunication networks that span the earth, through a 
global grid of close to 8 billion mobile connected devices (more than the human population). Individuals 
and organizations increasingly use these devices to continuously engage with digitally-enabled activities 
(which in turn generate digital traces).  The concomitant consumption, usage, and generation of computer-
mediated, computer-processed, and network-transmitted data have become an intrinsic feature of economic 
and social activity. 
3. This digital phenomenon cannot be reduced to its technological component: it is also social and 
economic. It is now abundantly clear that it changes not just how individuals and organizations use 
technologies, but also that it affects in non-obvious ways how firms compete and innovate. It also alters 
how humans relate to each other and to machines, how countries and regions redefine their competitive 
advantage, and it redefines to some extent the nature of work and the modalities of economic exchange. 
However, because it is such a recent and complex phenomenon that simultaneously affects individuals, 
organizations, industries (and to some extent countries, and regions) through a complex set of interactions 
along and across economic, social, and technological dimensions, we are just beginning to scrape the 
surface of comprehending the ways in which it impacts social welfare. 
1.2 Digital Economy: Benefits and Concerns 
4. The digital economy has generated new kinds of value for many individuals and organizations, as 
for example through increased connectivity and access to information, as well as access to online forms of 
commerce. The initial euphoria of the mid-1990s and early 2000saround the potential for the Internet and 
mobile connectivity to create value for many, through open markets by lowering barriers to entry into new 
growing markets for innovators and to lower barriers to access for millions of individuals to life-enriching 
technologies,, and thus to create a more prosperous and equitable society, it is a somewhat paradoxical that 
the last few years have witnessed the rise to dominance of a very small number of firms, and an 
unprecedented concentration of economic and technological power in the hands of a few (mostly north-
American) firms.  
5. More specifically, amid increasingly widespread concerns of dominance of a few profit-seeking 
commercial enterprises such as Google, Facebook, Amazon and Apple who have risen to global 
prominence and which provide the fundamental technologies, or platforms, which most users rely upon to 
conduct their digital tasks, there is a widespread realization among institutions which are responsible for 
                                                     
*
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the protection and enhancement of social welfare of the need to examine and scrutinize the conduct of 
digital powerhouses, if only to ensure fair treatment of society’s constituencies in their various expressions 
(consumers, citizens, smaller enterprises, workers, etc.) and take steps to curb potential abuses of 
dominance.  
1.3 Questions addressed in this article 
6. In this context, this article aims to answer the following two questions:  
 Question 1: How should antitrust authorities adapt competition law enforcement in digital 
platform markets? 
 Question 2: Should any regulatory reforms be implemented in this context? What would they 
consist of? 
7. These hotly contested debates have attracted significant resources to influence the outcomes. 
These debates involve international organizations such as the European Commission and the OECD, 
governments, regulatory agencies including the FTC and the FCC in the US, various competition 
authorities, consumer protection agencies, powerful technologies companies, representatives of smaller 
companies or incumbent firms, other business lobby groups and representatives of civil societies, all 
supported or accompanied by consultancies from the legal and economic profession, as well as academics, 
who help formulate various and often contradictory arguments based on law and economics.
1
  
8. For proponents of government intervention, the technological powerhouses of the digital 
economy should be scrutinized and their conduct regulated because they provide key digital platform 
technologies which are construed as the technological infrastructure of the digital economy, and because 
they own, control, and use users’ personal data in ways that are potentially detrimental to social welfare 
(Newman, 2013). For proponents of market laissez-faire, these same firms are heroic and successful 
private enterprises who ought to be allowed to benefit in an unfettered way from the market power they 
have rightly earned through their investment, effort, and talent, the assumption being that the market can 
deliver the best outcome for society without government intervention, and that  any monopoly which 
would fail to satisfy customers will be eventually overturned by dynamic market forces of supply and 
demand (Bork and Sidak, 2012). 
9. This paper aims to offer an informed and balanced opinion which acknowledges the most 
important contributions of both sides of the debate, and aims to suggest productive ways forward in a 
synthesis which should promote social welfare as well as not weaken the vibrancy of economic 
enterprises.
2
  
                                                     
1
  The author has not received any contribution or payment of any form from any of the organizations 
mentioned in this report. The author has been an Oral Witness for the UK Parliament for the Enquiry on 
Digital Platforms: see Gawer, A., (2015), House of Lords Supplementary Written Evidence (OPL0050), 
submitted to the UK Parliamentary Inquiry on Digital Platforms, UK Parliament 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-internal-market-
subcommittee/online-platforms-and-the-eu-digital-single-market/written/23342.html. The author has also 
written a report for the European Commission: Gawer, A. (2016), Online Platforms: Contrasting 
Perceptions of European Stakeholders: A Qualitative Analysis of the European Commission’s Public 
Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, European Commission 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/study-online-platforms-contrasting-perceptions-
european-stakeholders-qualitative-analysis 
2
  In order to contribute most effectively to the debate (in the required format of a short 10-page paper), I 
have elected to not repeat the arguments expressed in the Background Note [1] “Big Data: Bringing 
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2. Big Data and Platforms: Toward more precision on behaviours and conduct 
2.1 Big Data 
10. “Business models based on the vast collection and process of user data in nearly real-time in 
recent years have enabled companies to offer a wide range of innovative of customized services, often at 
zero prices, with substantial gains for consumers. At the same time, data-driven network effects reinforced 
by user feedback loops, and high economies of scale associated with information technology 
infrastructures, may provide companies that own the data with market power and create a tendency for 
markets to tip. Concern is rising that the increasing reliance and use of personal data is harmful to 
consumers. While some practitioners have proposed adapting competition tools and antitrust policy to 
tackle such issues, others believe that these can be better addressed by data and/or consumer protection 
agencies.” ([1], Abstract, p. 2). 
11. The term “Big Data”, although admittedly vague and lacking precision (see [1], p. 5. 2.1. #5), has 
been increasingly used to refer to “the information asset characterized by such a high Volume, Velocity and 
Variety to require specific technology and analytical methods for its transformation into value” (See [1] 
citing Mauro et al. 2016). Stucke and Grunes (2016) add Value of data as another component of Big Data, 
and note that “for personal data, each “V” has increased enormously over the last decade” (see [1], p. 5. 
2.1. #6). 
12. Beyond the obvious benefit of offering a “catchy” label, vague or overly broad constructs such as 
Big Data are rather unhelpful conceptually. They obfuscate the differentiated composition of economic 
agents involved, and do not help identify the various directional forces which these economic agents 
respond to. Big Data is a concept that lacks precision and regroups, unhelpfully and confusingly, different 
categories of constructs: assets, capabilities, in addition to under-specifying who is performing the actions. 
13. Because competition policy focuses on agents’ behaviours, rather than focusing on the Data asset 
itself (however Big it is), I suggest that rather than focusing on the “Big Data” as “information asset”, we 
should first clarify precisely the specific categories of agents and stakeholders active in digital contexts, 
and identify their behaviours and their impact. In other words, we need to make progress on the defining 
characteristics of the modalities of economic activity associated with digital competition and innovation. 
14. The reason we need to be clear about the categories of economic agents (I find helpful to identify 
platform owners, complementors, suppliers, consumers, end-users, citizens) is that even if sometimes 
individuals or organizations play multiple roles, these roles are distinct and so are the incentives associated 
with these roles.  
15. This more precise and granular approach will help us provide further clarity on micro-
mechanisms of value creation and value capture in digital industries, leading to clarify the potential 
implications of “Big Data” for competition policy. One essential category of economic agent which is 
specific to data-intensive industries is the category of platforms. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Competition Policy to the Digital Area” (OECD Ref. DAF/COMP(2016)14) which lays out clearly a 
number of important issues and broadly identifies the dimensions of existing debate based on a thorough 
review of the literature; instead, I aim to focus on points which have either not been adequately treated so 
far or have been overlooked.  
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2.2 Platforms  
16. “At the epicentre of the Big Data ecosystem, where many of the competition concerns are 
observed, platforms operate as the main interface between consumers and other market players”. ([1], 
2.4.1, p. 13). 
17. Platforms constitute a dominant organizational form in digital economies (see Gawer, 2014). The 
term platform has been used in a variety of ways.
3
 They associate specific multi-sided business models 
with connecting technologies which allow categories of economic agents to exchange and transact, as well 
as innovate, and are subject to network effects, which are increasing returns to scale on the demand side. 
18. Enterprises that leverage the power of platform business models have grown dramatically in size 
and scale over the past decade.
4
 No longer the sole domain of social media, travel, books or music, 
platform business models have made inroads into transportation, banking and even healthcare and energy. 
Platforms are now active in North America, Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Some platforms are 
household names such as Amazon, Apple, Google and Alibaba. Others have emerged more recently or hail 
from parts of the world that get less attention such as Rakuten (Japan), Delivery Hero (Germany), Naspers 
(South Africa), Flipkart (India) or Javago (Nigeria). Platform ecosystems are gaining ground through the 
digitalization of products, services and businesses processes and in the process are reshaping the global 
landscape.  
19. Platform companies contribute importantly to the economy. They have driven up productivity in 
multiple ways. One source of productivity has been achieved through highly efficient matching. E-
commerce marketplaces like eBay provide one example. Professional networks like LinkedIn provide 
another. Platforms have also improved productivity by supporting more efficient asset utilization. The 
ability of platforms to better utilize houses, cars, workspaces among other assets has spawned considerable 
interest and passion around the potential of the so-called “share economy.”5
 
In addition, platforms have 
been important sources of innovation. For example, in 2014, nine U.S. platforms were awarded 11,585 
patents.
6 
Finally, many start-up platforms have been successful in attracting significant investment from 
venture funds. Most so-called “unicorns” are in fact platform companies.7 
20. At the same time, platform companies have been disruptive. Online platforms have upended 
numerous brick and mortar chains and are making deep inroads into other industries from television to 
transportation. Although it is still early days, they have the potential to be equally disruptive to traditional 
approaches to banking, healthcare and energy services. Platforms have also attracted regulatory 
controversy. There have also been concerns that it may be easier for platform companies to avoid tax and 
                                                     
3
  See Gawer, A. and M. Cusumano (2002), Platform Leadership: How Intel, Microsoft and Cisco Drive 
Industry Innovation, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, for one the first treatments of platforms. 
For a more recent treatment of platforms, see Gawer, A. (2009) (Ed.), Platforms, Markets and Innovation, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham.  
4
  This section is derived from Gawer (2015), Gawer (2014), and Evans and Gawer (2016). 
5
  “The rise of the sharing economy: On the Internet, everything is for hire,” The Economist, March 9, 2013. 
6
  The companies are Microsoft, Google, Apple, Intel, Amazon, Yahoo!, Facebook, eBay and Salesforce. The 
patent data is from “2014 Top Patent Owners,” Intellectual Property Owners Association, June 2015. 
7
  Unicorns are private start-up companies that have achieved a valuation of $1billion or more without going 
to public capital markets.  A review Gawer and Evans (2016) conducted of the 115 companies listed as 
Unicorns by CB Insights in June 2015 found that 80 of these companies or 70 percent are platform 
companies. 
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insurance obligations.
8 
There has been a range of concerns about how platform companies classify workers 
as independent contractors in ways that unfairly squeeze wages and benefits.
9 
And, there have been 
concerns over the ability of platforms to dominate markets and undermine competition.
10
 
21. Definition: Digital platforms are technologies, products or services (which we sometimes 
associate with the companies that produce them) which create value in two main ways, which I call 
Transaction Platforms and Innovation Platforms 
22. Transaction Platforms: Facilitate transactions or exchange between a large number (and 
different types) of individuals or organizations, which otherwise would have difficulty finding each other, 
or exchanging with each other: these are transaction platforms (e.g., Uber, Google search, Amazon 
Marketplace; Facebook), using capture and transmission of data, including personal data, over the Internet. 
Within transaction platforms, one can distinguish matching platforms that provide a marketplace where 
different types of economic agents can interact such as buyers and sellers, and so-called “attention 
platforms” such as search engines or social networks which typically provide a set of free services that are 
subsidized by advertising sold on a per-click basis. 
23. An important feature of platforms is the ability to efficiently match buyers and sellers in the 
market. While there is always friction associated with transactions between buyers and sellers, by building 
new software and harnessing the speed and scale of the Internet, platforms help reduce that friction. 
Innovative platform entrepreneurs have discovered that there are ways to get the flywheel going faster if 
one side of the market is incentivized to join, for example, by being subsidized. This is why it is not 
uncommon to see platforms offering deep discounts to one side of a market or even provide “freemium” 
goods or services to third parties to induce them to join, contribute and even innovate on the platform.  
24. Innovation Platforms: Offer a technologically shared resource which can be connected upon and 
tapped into by (i.e., they act as a foundation on top of which) a large number of individuals or 
organizations who can innovate in complementary products or technologies or services. In other words, 
innovation platforms act as a technological foundation on top of which external entities can innovate. 
Archetypal examples include the iPhone and hundreds of thousands of app developers; Google Android 
and its vast ecosystem of app developer. These platforms offer digital tools such as APIs (Application 
Programming Interfaces) or Software Developer Kits to make it easier for developers of complementary 
software to innovate on complementary services or technologies or apps
25. Innovation platforms consist therefore of technological building blocks that are used as a 
foundation upon which a large number of innovators can develop complementary services or products. 
These complementary innovators can be anyone, anywhere in the world, and together they form what is 
called an innovation ecosystem around the platform. An example is the iPhone, which has hundreds of 
thousands of applications. Those applications are developed by innovators all over the world, who use 
Apple technology the company makes available through software connectors sometimes called APIs— 
                                                     
8
  See, for example, Pierre Collin, and Nicolas Colin. “Task Force on Taxation of the Digital Economy.” 
Report to the French Minister for the Economy and Finance, the Minister for Industrial Recovery, Minister 
Delegate for the Budget and the Minister Delegate for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, Innovation 
and the Digital Economy 2013. 
9
  Greg Bensinger, “Startups Scramble to Define ‘Employee’, Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2015; and Naom 
Scheiber, “Growth in the ‘Gig Economy’ Fuels Work Force Anxieties,” New York Times, July 12, 2015. 
10
  Gawer, A. (2016), Online Platforms: Contrasting Perceptions of European Stakeholders: A Qualitative 
Analysis of the European Commission’s Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, 
European Commission https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/study-online-platforms-
contrasting-perceptions-european-stakeholders-qualitative-analysis; 
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application programming interfaces—or software developer kits, which will in effect continue the cycle of 
innovation and growth. Most innovation platforms today are digital and have a versatile and powerful 
software engine.
11
 
26. One key feature of innovation platforms is that they allow platform owners to tap into a 
potentially unlimited pool of external innovators, in what is called an innovation ecosystem. Contrary to 
what happens within a traditional supply-chain, platform owners do not have to know in advance who or 
where the external innovators might be: it is these external innovators themselves (the developers of 
complementary products or services) who seek the platform and attempt to connect to it: The platform 
becomes a magnet for complementary innovators. The degree of openness, which the platform owner will 
design the interfaces (often associated with Software Developer Kits and Application Programming 
Interfaces, coupled with relatively low fees of access) will encourage and stimulate complementary 
innovation, which will allow the ecosystem to thrive.  
Figure 1. Transaction and Innovation Platforms 
 
27. Gawer and Evans (2016) suggest that the largest and most successful platforms such as Apple, 
Facebook, Google and Amazon, all tend to combine transaction platforms with innovation platforms: 
Apple iOS and App Store, Facebook and Facebook Connect, Google Search and Google Play. 
                                                     
11
  See Evans, D.S., Hagiu, A. and R. Schmalensee (2006), Invisible Engines: How Software Platforms Drive 
Innovation and Transform Industries, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 DAF/COMP/WD(2016)74 
 9 
3. Competition Concerns about Digital Platforms (in the context of Big Data) 
3.1 Network Effects and Barriers to Entry 
28. A fundamental feature of platforms is the presence of network effects: platforms become more 
valuable as more users use them.
12 
As more users engage with the platform, the platform becomes more 
attractive to potential new users. This goes a long way toward explaining why some platforms have had 
viral growth. There are two kinds of network effects: direct network effects (where more users beget more 
users, as in more Facebook users will beget more Facebook users) and indirect network effects where more 
users of one side of the platform (for example, video game users) attracts more users on the other side of 
the platform (in this example, video game developers). Jeff Bezos, the founder and CEO of Amazon, refers 
to this reinforcing virtuous dynamic as the “Amazon flywheel.”13  
29. They become more valuable to users when other users use them. E.g., Facebook, but also Google. 
In addition to the ability to efficiently and imaginatively match, they also have an amazing ability to 
accelerate innovation. One way is to open up to third-party applications. Apple created an innovation 
machine facilitated by the App Store. The company readily admits that third-party developers came up 
with ideas at a speed and scale that Apple could not have achieved with internal developers alone. Specific 
programs give developers promotional credits to assist in advertising apps and access to its App Store 
network of millions of customers in nearly 200 countries.  
30. It is important to understand that with platforms, scale is both the outcome of initial success 
and the engine for the further growth. Network effects existed before online platforms, for example, the 
telephone network. But today, where individuals have access to pervasive connectivity that is facilitated by 
the Internet, and where there are 7 billion mobile phones in the hands of users—this ease of 
communication has increased the network effects. With platforms, scale creates value and attracts 
additional users. This dynamic creates a self-sustaining momentum for growth.  
31. Some scholars have wrongly assumed that the presence of network effects directly leads to 
winner-take-all outcomes. We now understand that strong network effects are not sufficient to ensure a 
winner-take-all outcome. 
3.2 The European Commission Enquiry on the Regulatory Environment of Digital Platforms: 
 Focus on Platforms 
32. The European Commission orchestrated in 2016 a public consultation on platforms has generated 
a very large number of responses from a wide variety of European stakeholders. I analysed the evidence 
corresponding to the qualitative questions about digital platforms (see [3] Gawer, 2016). Across this 
diverse stakeholder grouping, a number of key themes emerge, which include: 
                                                     
12
  See Parker and Van Alstyne (2005), “Two-Sided Network Effect: A Theory of Information Product 
Design,” Management Science; 51 (10); Armstrong (in “Competition in Two-Sided Market”, RAND 
Journal of Economics; 2006, p. 66) defines two-sided markets as “markets involving two groups of agents 
interacting via ‘platforms’ where one group’s benefit from joining a platform depends on the size of the 
other group that joins the platform”. They have also been defined as “businesses in which pricing and other 
strategies are strongly affected by the indirect network effects between the two sides of the platform” 
according to: Evans and Schmalensee (2008), “Markets with Two-Sided Platforms,” Issues in Competition 
Law and Policy (ABA section of antitrust law) 1, p. 667.  
13
  See Stone, B. The Everything Store: Jeff Bezos and the Age of Amazon, Random House, 2013, p. 126. 
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1. Businesses and associations of businesses were primarily concerned with platforms dominance 
leading to competition and fair-trading issues, copyright/IP rights protection, and to some extent 
the fairness of rankings and neutrality of online search results. A number of business respondents 
would like to see online platforms taking more responsibility for the user-generated content they 
provide access to.  
2. Associations of consumers and individual citizens were mostly concerned with data protection, 
and the difficulty to enforce consumer rights.  
3. Civil society associations were mostly concerned with issues related to privacy, anonymity, and 
censorship. They are concerned with online platforms’ “taking down” of user-generated content, 
which they attribute to online platforms being overly responsive to contestation of posted content 
by either governments or by private entities, and which they see as an arbitrary form of 
censorship threatening free speech and diversity of views. 
4. There were some common broad themes around concerns for illegal, criminal and fraudulent 
online activity, and the difficulty of enforcing existing legislation. 
5. Contrasting views emerged however between businesses and civil society respondents around the 
question of liability of online platforms on the user-generated content they provide broad access 
to. While business respondents tend to want to increase the responsibility of some online 
platforms for the content they publish and the potentially illegal activities they indirectly 
facilitate, civil society respondents warn of the potential censorship implications.  
3.3  Market Power in Digital Platforms 
33. The conventional wisdom on platforms and big data associates platforms with market power 
which is apparently due to network effects. Some also mention a “data barrier to entry” (Newman 2013). 
34. Network effects are increasing returns to scale in demand. It is important to dispel the myth that 
network effects necessarily lead to winners take all: in general, they don’t. They only do if there are strong 
network effects, little room for differentiation, and high cost of multihoming (Eisenmann, Parker and Van 
Alstyne, 2007) 
35. Phenomena that are similar to network effects (increasing returns to scale) also exist in non-
digital, non-“big data” space. Examples include: learning, or economies of scale in manufacturing. The 
existence of increasing returns to scale (whether in supply or in demand) does not necessarily guarantee 
success in the market place. 
36. There is nothing automatic in the use of data or the use of double sided business models who lead 
automatically to market success or market dominance: market power is achieved through efforts and talent, 
and meeting consumer demand in the face of competition. The existence of network effects can help, but 
cannot alone guarantee success. 
37. The strength of network effects alone does not magically lead to market success: it requires 
investment and not all firms have similar capabilities in uncovering the power of data (as attests 
telecommunication operators’ failure to utilise the vast amount of data they had on their installed base, 
versus how internet companies such as Google managed to do it. 
38. So, it is plausible that market dominance may be the result of superior performance and superior 
value proposition being delivered to users. However, once market power is achieved, how do firms 
maintain it? How do they erect barriers to entry (to sustain their competitive advantage)? 
 DAF/COMP/WD(2016)74 
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39. Furthermore, it is perfectly normal, expected, and even taught in any MBA class, that as an 
innovator and a pioneer in a market you should try to prevent competitors to imitate you in order to protect 
your profits in a sustainable manner. These firms are just trying to do this: protect their ability to derive 
profits from their innovations.  
40. In what way is this “bad” (or even “new”)? All firms try to the extent of their capabilities to 
solidify, strengthen and increase their ability to capture value from their innovation: it usually requires 
them to exert some degree of control over tightly held complementary assets or complementary activities 
(distribution, branding, or patents etc. – a la Teece (1986). 
41. In the digital context, the “complementary assets” are the Data and complementary activities are 
“making sense of the data” (through data analytics and big data). The locus of these complementary assets 
and the nature of this activity require elaboration (as these are specific to the data / digital phenomenon and 
digital activities):  
42. There are some important specificities about Data as assets: Data can be found at the individual 
level, as well as at the aggregate level. It can be originated by humans, as well as by machines. It can also 
be combined and be morphed and be made to generate new data through automatic, non-human mediated 
processes.  
43. How does aggregation of data make sense? Data can be assembled about an individual, over 
time, revealing patterns of behaviour. Firms that manage to establish sustained relationships with 
individuals over time can hugely benefit, as connected individuals are endless sources of coherent patterns 
of data. Individual data points can also be treated as elemental sources of data units which can be 
aggregated into patterns (classes of data) to extract meaning from them. Individuals are both sources of 
continuous patterns at the individual level, and are data points within clusters of aggregate data comprising 
of populations of individuals. There are therefore many ways to “make sense” of data.  
44. “Making sense of data” is a key complementary activity which reinforces the ability to generate 
and to capture value from digitally-mediated engagement with end-users. 
45. Why is it then that these firms who are applying perfectly normal (and expected) strategies to 
protect their ability to capture value are being “reproached” for mis-behaving? What is that that they are 
doing wrong? What is it that they are “missing"? Or, are the accusations unfounded?  
46. The answer hinges on an assessment of whether the data is perceived or not as an “essential 
input”, and that the behaviour of companies not to share it is “exclusionary”. As this is obviously going to 
be a contested point, it will be up to society to decide how essential it is  for individuals to control their 
data, how valid a claim and realistically feasible it is to design technological and organizational or market 
mechanisms to assess the value of data captured (this is a hard problem as data can be morphed and 
aggregated and can be used in multiple contexts by multiple constituencies) and to install systems that 
allow users to get compensated from others’ use of their data. Society (as regulators) could also decide that 
data, perhaps anonymized, should be a shared resource.  
47. What does abuse of power / abuse of dominance express itself in this context? (i.e., what does it 
look like in this context?) Traditionally, we can expect market power to be expressed by high prices. 
However this is not the case here because of multi-sided pricing. Hint: not always by high prices on one 
side. How do you know there is market power? it is not that clear cut, because it depends on your vantage 
point and on your assumption of what is socially desirable and how you evaluate the trade-offs involved.  
48. As a suggestion: when in doubt, let us return to first principles: The concept of power or abuse of 
power rests on sometimes implicit assumption of what “fair” or “socially desirable” objectives not being 
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met. A clarification is therefore needed and will require discussion among society representatives: What 
are the socially desirable objectives?  
 Is it: free access to search? (if so, then all is well in this world – no complaint should be had) 
 Is it: fair compensation for individuals who are “giving away” their information (and their data?) 
It is fair to say that people’s own perception of the value of their data has changed (thanks to the 
creation of value and capture of value from their data by firms such as Google and Facebook and 
Amazon etc.) It is therefore the case that these firms have played an irreversible role into the 
development of consciousness about the value of data – nobody before them had been able to 
generate such value from data and to capture so much from it (in combination with their efforts 
of course). 
 And how does competition law or regulation can effectively play a role in digital contexts to 
ensure these are met? 
4. A proposal for Regulation of Data 
4.1 A problem: What is the Value of Data?  
49. The process of using digital technologies, requires us to voluntarily or unwittingly share our 
personal information. In doing so, we are helping digital platform firms to create and appropriate value 
from ever more sophisticated data-rich web services. It is unclear as to how users, beyond the free services 
such as Internet search or connectivity with friends on social networks (offered at zero price – a kind of 
flat-fee payment to users -- thanks to the multi-sided business models adopted by platform firms), can 
obtain direct benefits from their data input.  
50. Obviously, creating value does not necessarily imply capturing value. In order to understand 
why only a small number of economic agents seem to derive most value from the data that is generated by 
so many, it is not enough to examine their incentives in this space, but we also need to be mindful of the 
heterogeneous capabilities of stakeholders to create value from Big Data (by processing it, aggregating it, 
analysing it, making sense of it, re-injecting it into dynamic databases or social graphs, etc.), as well as 
their differential abilities to capture value from data (this has to do with the amount or lack of competition 
they face, as well as the relatively low or high degree of bargaining power from suppliers, buyers, and 
complementors). It is in retrospect self-evident but too often forgotten that rather than discussing “Value” 
in the vacuum, it is always important to always clarify Value for Whom. We need to understand better the 
determinants and consequences of behaviours of these important categories of economic agents that are 
involved in the big data-related activities. 
51. It is difficult for individuals to know what the value of their data is ex-ante. It might even be 
impossible to assess this ex-ante. This difficulty however does not preclude making efforts toward a more 
equitable way to distribute the value ex-post that is stemming from the use of the data. 
52. Cross-subsidies business models, frequent in multi-sided markets, obfuscate the value of data. 
53. Right now the benefit which users get from sharing their data is not proportional, nor is it directly 
related, to the value that is being captured by the platform owner. Is this an externality which is not being 
internalized? Is this a source of inefficiency? Does this create a lack of incentive to provide more or better 
data, as well as a (perhaps unfounded) concern that this data-sharing constitutes an “unfair transaction”? 
But what would a “fair transaction” over personal data look like? And how do you know that a transaction 
is fair if you don’t have the means to evaluate the value (in the other person’s eye) of the asset you are 
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giving? Are we facing a similar situation of where the American Indians gave away the land for a few glass 
beads? Or is it rather that individuals now are made to be feeling that their data is extremely precious, 
whereas it might be only when mixed with thousands and thousands of other pieces of information that 
others can make sense of greater patterns which are valuable?  
54. One thing is certain, it is difficult for users to assess the real value of their data because there are 
no market mechanisms to evaluate the value of personal data. There is also no consensus or clarity on the 
principles that should govern such an evaluation: Should it be the net present value of all the uses that are 
being generated? Some of the platform firms claim that the elements of data provided by individual end-
users have either no intrinsic value, or not enough value that it deserves any kind of direct retribution. 
There are therefore contrasting views as to what the value of the data provided by end-users actually is. 
This creates situations of asymmetric information, and no clear way to resolve it. 
4.2 Consumers as Developers: non-separability of roles of consumers as complementors  
 or “Pro- sumers” 
55. In digital contexts, using data implies generating data:  there is a clear interdependency between 
supply roles and consuming roles for individuals: Consumers generate data as they use digital services. 
Figure 2. Consumers generate data as the use digital services 
 
56. This non-separation across usage and generativity of data leads to a suggestion: there needs to be 
some connection and coherent design of competition law and consumer law. 
57. This also leads to some practical suggestions as to how to regulate data. Data is “the glue” 
between all sorts of human activities which require regulations. But according to which principles should 
data be regulated? 
58. In order to answer this let us examine the different roles of data: 
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1. Data as input: if data (or certain kinds of data) are to be considered as essential input, or part of 
an infrastructure, then the consequences might be compulsory disclosure of some parts of that 
data, to ensure free or fair access to input. This would be the case in particular in the case of 
essential input or essential facility  
2. Data as expression of free speech; consequence: rules regarding free speech and concerns about 
censorship 
3. Data as output: here the consequences would be to ensure ability for stakeholders to benefit 
from selling the data (which is problematic when intellectual property rights are not respected) 
4. Data as integral part of the production technology (inseparable from production processes in 
digital technologies, i.e., in deep-learning algorithms). Challenges stemming from that would 
concern the lack of protection of consumers who have difficulty evaluating a separable and 
measurable value for their data and a price for themselves, who would have generated that data. 
4.3 European Commission enquiry on the regulatory environment on digital platforms:  
 focus on  data 
59. The results of this study indicated that online platforms’ use of information and data is a cause 
for concern for consumers and citizens, as personal data is used in ways than are not transparent. However, 
the General Data Protection Regulation seems to reassure businesses. 
60. The main theme was increased transparency to help build trust and mutual confidence.  
 Businesses and associations of businesses suggested clear display of online platforms’ 
compliance with IP rights, clarity over usage of data, transparency / traceability of online service 
operators.   
 Associations of consumers and individual citizens suggested displaying display of information on 
how personal data is monetized by online platforms, clearer terms and conditions, and clearer 
display of what remedies are available to consumers. 
 Civil society associations suggested clear displays of the criteria for de-listing content, better 
information on how user at is tracked and where data is stored, and display of controls to ensure 
child protection. 
 Think tanks recommend clear displays of distinction between professional and non-professionals 
operating on online platforms. 
 Common themes included displaying the extent which sponsored content is included in 
generating search results, and better information on reviews. 
 Types of formats commonly suggested for additional displayed information included the use of 
icons and pictograms, and layered summaries instead of lengthy texts. 
61. Online platforms themselves consider that they treat suppliers fairly, and identify various means 
by which they do. They point to the natural alignment of business incentives and the regularly efficient 
business terms and practices, including open communication, transparency, compliance with rules, help 
desks, and efficient APIs allowing customisation. 
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62. Access to data on online platforms: A number of respondents in these categories recognize that 
data is a key resource in the digital economy, and the economic potential of innovative data-driven 
businesses. A number of respondents express concerns over too much regulation in this area. Some online 
platforms in particular oppose mandatory portability of data. However, some businesses and consumers 
welcome an open repository of personal data, subject to consents, that would act as an “open platform”. 
5. Conclusion: Regulating “Digital Platforms” 
63. To what extent should Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement be changed? To what 
extent should a new regulation be designed on digital platforms? What institutional form should it have? 
64. Digital platforms over the Internet are reaching every aspect on economic life. They have a huge 
strategic importance, have become central to a significant portion of the economic activities, and this set of 
technologies which can be compared to a digital infrastructure, has as much importance as electricity, 
water, highways, which joins together people livelihoods, people well-being, people security, people 
access to basic services and other access to fundamental services, including energy, transport, health, 
education, etc. 
65. The early years of the Internet and the emergence of digital platforms have created a lot of value 
for consumers and citizens, and for many companies, but there have now been increasing concerns that we 
might be getting to a point where a number of issues are becoming salient. 
66. The dangers of over-regulation or overly complex regulation are well understood: the results of 
the Enquiry on the Regulatory Environment for Digital Platforms from the European Commission have 
indicated the caution that many stakeholders want governments to exert vis a vis the creation of a new set 
of encompassing regulations on platforms, favouring better implementation of existing rules and only the 
minimum amount of new rules. 
67. This said, there is a plausible economic and social case for the creation of a global regulatory 
framework that will regulate the use, handling, and ownership and transmission rights of data. 
68. The challenge for regulators is to protect and stimulate the vibrancy of digital platforms as 
creators of growth, jobs, and value, while protecting consumers and citizens from the very power that 
stems from the growth of these platforms. Crafting rules that will benefit the multiple categories of 
stakeholders is challenging, but there are strong reasons to attempt to do it well. 
69. In the current geo-political context, there are vast discrepancies across the world regions in their 
ability to capture value from digital platforms. At the same time, there are observable differences and even 
divergences in the way antitrust and competition policy is applied (for example in the US vs in Europe). 
This creates distortions in the global market, and will eventually weaken the market. The most powerful 
digital platforms are North American multinational commercial enterprises, and regions have had difficulty 
enforcing laws in specific geographic areas, as data can be re-routed and multinational have proven adept 
at evading local laws (as in for example evading tax). In the face of growing concern about digital 
platforms, and in a general context of protectionism as exemplified by Brexit and the recent US 
presidential election, it should be self-evident to digital platform firms that they should have a strong 
interest to work in partnership with economies all over the world.   
70. The European digital platform market has underperformed the US, and it is possible that this is at 
least partially due to lack of a single digital market, which prevented European firms from benefitting from 
economies of scale on the demand side. In this context, and if there is not enough cooperation from the US 
and North American powerful digital platforms, it is possible that Europe too would be tempted to resort to 
political protectionism in this area. 
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71. If countries could find a way to agree to some common international rules through the help of 
coordinating organizations such as the OECD, working to overcome the difference in outlook between the 
US and Europe, they would achieve a key step towards a truly global market for digital platforms. There is 
great collective interest in agreeing on “the rules of the game” which would create a global level-playing 
field. Failing that, it is likely that just like China and Russia, Europe and other countries would be tempted 
to resort to knee-jerk, over-zealous protectionism. 
72. As consumers are also co-producers of data-driven technologies, and are also citizens who care 
for the protection of their data, for regulation purposes, it is important that these issues (competition policy, 
consumer rights) are not addressed in a piecemeal fashion, but rather that they benefit from an integrated 
and coordinated treatment across functional regulatory areas. 
73. The OECD could play a leading role in orchestrating the discussion among member countries as 
well as non-member countries toward the establishment of: 
1. A Global Digital & Data Regulator, on the model of international organizations such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the ITU (which already has a locus to oversee internet 
connectivity, data and voice) or the WIPO, which would  help build consensus to create a global 
regulatory framework. 
 This would be a central and independent regulatory agency that coordinates and oversees the 
different aspects of monitoring and regulating the Internet and the data that flows through 
it: consumer protection and protection of data against commercial abuse or criminality (including 
mafia, terrorism, extremisms and cyberattacks, etc.) 
 This Digital & Data regulator also needs to ensure citizens’ protection from governments who are 
increasingly accessing personal data often without good cause 
 The Digital & Data regulator would have to submit every single new regulation, to be cleared 
with the Global Competition Authority 
2. A Global Competition Authority, on the model of international organizations which have legal and 
arbitration panels such as the WTO and the WIPO: 
 This Authority will deal with all aspects of competition and anti-competitive behaviour, whether 
digital or no. 
 Every regulatory decision made by the new Global Digital & Data Regulator would have to be 
subject to a cost-benefit analysis from the independent Global Competition Authority. 
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